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The NebrasJ:<.a ~egisla ture: 
policy Imphcatlons of Its 
organiza tion and Operation 
---Robert Sittig 
8 
The adoption of a nonpartisan unicameral legislature by Nebraska voters 
• 1934 increased the opportunity for distinctive policymaking in the state. 
:ohiS reform moved Nebraska to the forefront on many measures of 
:gislative capability, such as structural simplicity, open deliberative process, 
,e d level of staff assistance. Yet, the Unicameral lags behind other states on d~her measures of legislative effectiveness and modernization. This is 
°llustrated by inadequate compensation for legislators, insufficient winnowing 
I f bills prior to floor consideration, and modest restraint of interest group 
activity. The uniqueness of the Unicameral continues to bring Nebraska 
attention. Although its organization and operation receive favorable evaluation, ~ertain features require review and possible change. 
policymaking in American political institutions is 
assigned constitutionally to the legislative branch of 
rrovernment. Policy application and adjudication are the 
o 
responsibilities of the executive and judicial branches of 
government, but these phases of the governmental process 
follow the initiation of policy by the legislature. 
This chapter addresses policy initiatives and the 
ways in which they are handled in Nebraska's uniquely 
structured, single-chamber, nonpartisan legislature. Given 
this uniqueness, considerable attention will be given to 
comparisons of the legislative process in Nebraska and 
in other states. The performance of Nebraska's 
legislature will be evaluated, as well. Because all state 
policy must receive legislative approval, it behooves 
policy advocates to become familiar with the organization 
and operation of the Nebraska legislature. Additionally, 
those seeking to influence policy matters should be 
aWare of recent changes and proposals to reform the 
\ebraska Unicameral. 
NEBRASKA POLICY CHOICES 1987, ed. Russell L. Smith 
(Omaha: Center for Applied Urban Research, 1987). 
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Important Historical Events 
The adoption of the initiated constitutional amendment 
by the citizens of Nebraska in 1934, providing for 
single-chambered and nonpartisan legislature, set thi a 
state apart from all others. 1 These two institutiona~ 
alterations left a distinct imprint on the proceedings of 
Nebraska's legislature in form and practice. The 
unicameral reform proposal was a product of the 
progressive movement, and was advocated by many 
Nebraskans m the early twentieth century. The 
nonpartisan feature, although urged by populist and 
progressive groups, was much more the handwork of 
U.S. Senator George Norris, who, during the late 1920s , 
breathed new life into the largely stalemated unicameral 
movement in Nebraska. He was the architect of the two-
pronged, nonpartisan unicameral reform, and worked 
strenuously during the public phase of the 1934 campaign 
to get the amendment adopted. 
Since adoption, these institutional factors have given 
a special character to the legislative process in 
Nebraska, and they contribute much of what is different 
about policymaking in this state, when compared with 
other states. Finally, the unicameral aspect of 
Nebraska's legislature is established so solidly that there 
is little question regarding its future. The nonpartisan 
aspect continues to generate persistent criticism from a 
variety of sources, and its future is somewhat less 
assured than that of unicameralism. 
Institutional Changes Since Adoption 
Since the adoption of the unicameral system, the 
most visible institutional changes have involved the terms 
of office, number of legislators, and length of session 
fbe Legislature 275 
fOf the legislature. The term of office was doubled (and 
taggered) to 4 years in 1962; longer terms are an 
S verpresent pattern in elective posts at all levels of 
;overnment. Next, the number of legislators increased 
from 43 to 49 in the midsixties as a result of political 
and judicial skirmishing over the need to remedy urban 
underrepresentation. 
Increased urban representation resulted in reshaped 
legislative agendas and the adoption of many urban-
oriented policy initiatives in state legislatures, including 
Nebraska. Another alteration of the formal machinery 
was the change to annual sessions in 1971; previously, 
nearlY all state legislatures met only once every 2 years, 
but now, nearly all meet every year to review legislative 
proposals. The current organizational arrangement of the 
Unicameral seems firmly implanted despite occasional 
efforts, all unsuccessful, to alter it in some fashion 
(for example, return to biennial sessions, removal of the 
lieutenant governor as presiding officer, reintroduction of 
partisanship, and installation of a parliamentary system). 
Internal Leadership Authority 
The internal allocation of authority in the legislature, 
however, has been more subject to alteration. The 
current leadership positions include speaker, president, 
Executive Board, and Committee on Committees. These 
officers and bodies have undergone numerous shifts in 
duties, roles, and powers. Of greatest importance is the 
speakership, where a series of changes during the past 
two decades has brought this official to the forefront of 
the Unicameral. This is a major departure from the 
past; earlier, the Unicameral held to the principle that 
the legislative process should be as open and unstructured 
as possible. But, by the 1980s, the speaker had been 
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authorized to coordinate the committee system, to set th 
daily agenda, to designate a number of bills fa e 
preferential floor consideration, and, by practice / 
serve as the presiding officer over floor deliber~tian 0 
despite the constitutional prOVISlQn designating th: 
lieutenant governor for this role. 
Additionally, the last two speakers have overcome a 
tradition of noncontinuation in the office, and have been 
re-elected. It seems only a matter of time Or 
circumstance until some speaker, through skill and 
effectiveness, becomes a long-term (perhaps career) 
holder of this office. Even with growth in stature, the 
primary source of influence behind other state legislative 
speakers--leadership of the majority political partY--is 
not part of the speaker's power base. Regardless, the 
powers of the office have grown steadily In recent 
years. 
Nearly the opposite is true for the president of the 
legislature, the lieutenant governor. Repeated attempts 
have been made since 1970 to reposition the office, but a 
final solution has evaded the reformers. The pattern in 
many states has been to team up the election of 
governors and lieutenant governors, to assign the second 
executive full-time administrative duties, and to reduce 
or eliminate their legislative role (table 1). The other 
Table 1 - Legislative power of state lieutenant governors 
Power 
Presiding officer 
Break tie votes 
Assign bills 
Appoint committees 
Number of states 
28 (including Nebraska) 
26 (including Nebraska) 
16 
10 
Source: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
The Question of State Government Capability, Washington, DC, 
1985, p. 9-5. 
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extreme is evident in six states where the office of 
lieutenant governor has been abolished. Some movement 
toward the team approach and a full-time administrative 
role for the lieutenant governor has occurred in 
Nebraska, but legal and political complications have 
stalled the process for the time being. 
The Executive Board of the Legislature is composed 
of two elected officers, six regional representatives of 
the senators, the speaker, and the chair of the 
Appropriations Committee ex-officio. Their responsi-
bilities are to supervise all staff personnel and to act on 
behalf of the legislature when it is not in session. 
Additionally, they assign bills and approve and assign 
studies concerning new policy questions to committees. 
This body can be considered an administrative entity 
rather than a policymaking unit, although this is not 
always true. For example, the number and assignment of 
legislative staff influence the substantive performance of 
the legislature. 
The Committee on Committees has a small but 
important role in the organization of each new 
legislature, that of assigning legislators to committees. 
The body has an elected chair and twelve regional 
representatives who review requests for committee 
assignments and assign members within size and 
geographi cal constraints. Apparently, nearly all requests 
can be granted or adjusted satisfactorily because 
complaints about assignments are rare. 
Staff Resources 
The major recent physical change within the 
Unicameral has been in facilities and resources (offices 
and staff) provided to senators. Much of the impetus for 
this came from the increased time commitment required 
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of senators, which stemmed from the shift to annUal 
sessions, and, to a lesser extent, the increased workload 
associated with interim studies of new and controversial 
issues by standing committees. This means that senators 
are on full-time duty about 6 months of the year and on 
call intermittently after the session for interim 
committee responsibilities and occasional special 
sessions. Accordingly, during the past 10 years, the 
senators have provided themselves, through the Executive 
Board, with individual offices near the chamber and two 
full-time staffers (one research, the other clerical) per 
legislator. This has been a major change in the 
legislature's staffing pattern, and it puts Nebraska in a 
group of ten states that assign year-around staff to 
individual senators; nearly all of these states have large 
populations (table 2). In a few states (not Nebraska), 
the legislators also have staffed offices in their home 
districts (Council of State Governments, 1986). 
Table 2 - Staff assistance provided to individual state 
legislators, 1987 
Level of assistance States 
Number 
Full-time professional and clerical 10 1 
Some professional and some clerical 13 
Clerical only 16 
Secretarial pool only 11 
1 California, Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin. 
Source: Alan Rosenthal, Legislative Life, New York, 
1981, p. 207. 
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Of much longer duration is the Unicameral's 
divisional staff which provides support for legislators, 
committees, and leaders (such as, bill drafting, research, 
and recordkeeping). It has increased somewhat in number 
as the legislative task has grown and the length of the 
session has increased. Positioned between the divisional 
and senators' staffs are the standing committee staffs. 
Committee staffing began about 20 years ago with 
the Appropriations (then Budget) Committee, and was 
gradually extended to all committees. The committee 
research staffs vary in number from one to ten, plus 
each committee has one clerical position. It would seem 
that the legislature, through its divisional, committee, and 
senatorial staffs which currently number about 250, is 
noW better equipped to deal with the policy options they 
review. 
Legislative Process: Early Stages 
The introduction of bills provides the legislature 
with its official business. Although only members may 
introduce bills, most originate outside the legislature. 
Bills are quickly assigned to committee according to 
their subject; for example, school consolidation to the 
Education Committee and control of irrigation to the 
Natural Resources Committee. The number of bills being 
introduced has climbed in recent years, and, given the 
constraints on session time (90 days in odd and 60 days 
in even years), the system is pressed to handle them in 
a timely and efficient way. A previous attempt to 
restrict the number of bills a senator could introduce 
proved to be unworkable, so other remedies have 
evolved. The most recent is the ranking of bills by 
senators, committees, and the speaker. 
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Committee Organization and Operation 
The standing committee arrangement in the 
Unicameral is moderately complex, with thirteen 
committees having from seven to nine members each 
(figure O. The number and size of committees have 
been quite stable since the 195Os, although there have 
been periodic adjustments of committee titles 
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Standing Committees of the Nebraska Legislature, 1987 
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jurisdictions, and workloads. The most recent adjustment 
carne in 1986, when one committee was abolished, 
another divided, and two others retitled. These 
jurisdictional changes are difficult to initiate because 
theY entail the shifting of arenas (but not senators) 
where preliminary decisionmaking occurs. Despite 
reluctance to make changes, the legislature coordinates 
its policymaking structure with the executive branch, as 
the state government policy agenda evolves. 
Each committee is headed by a chair who presides at 
cornmittee meetings and generally directs committee 
activities. Since 1973, these leaders have been elected in 
floor votes (all are eligible to run) when a new 
legislature organizes. Those selected must be approved 
every 2 years. While partisan and seniority factors 
predominate in the selection of committee chairs in other 
state legislatures and the national congress, these factors 
are only slightly important in Nebraska. For example, the 
unofficial partisan lineup in the chamber in 1987 showed 
a slight Republican majority (25 Republicans, 23 
Democrats, and I Independent), yet seven of the thirteen 
committee chairs elected were Democrats. The 
qualifications required of first-time chair candidates and 
those seeking re-election include, prior service on the 
committee for aspirants and support from those who 
served on the committee for former chairs. In only 6 of 
58 instances has a committee chair been defeated from 
1973 to 1987, and in about three-fourths of the cases, 
chairs who sought re-election faced no opposition. This 
indicates the evolution of leadership stability in these 
bodies, and contrasts with the system used prior to 1973, 
When appointments resulted in wholesale changes from 
one legislature to the next. 
Senators are assigned to committees after presenting 
their requests to regional caucuses of the Committee on 
282 Robert Sittig 
Committees. The assignments need to coincide with size 
and geographical constraints that are intended to make 
each committee reflective of the entire body, and, thus 
representative of the entire state. The geographic~ 
factor is perhaps the more important one; standing 
committees normally have two legislators from each of 
four regions of the state (far west, north central, south 
central, and Omaha metro).2 This builds a geographical 
dimension into committee structure and decisionmaking. 
In other states, partisan and seniority factors weigh 
much more heavily, sometimes absolutely, in matters 
such as allocation of seats on committees and committee 
assignments. 
Given the rarity of committee chair losses, tenure 
of chairs and committee members has been increasing 
steadily. In the absence of complicating factors, such as 
chairing a committee to which the senator has not been 
assigned or filling the speaker's post (which precludes 
any committee service), about three-fifths of re-elected 
senators remain on the committees they were assigned to 
in the previous legislature. This is evidence that 
members prefer serving on a committee rather than 
transferring and broadening their policy perspective, an 
attribute of considerable importance, but apparently less 
so than policy specialization. 
Committee Influence 
Research indicates that the legislative committees, in 
Nebraska and elsewhere, are making the definitive 
decisions on legislative proposals. 3 It seems that the 
floor of the legislature is where decisions ought to be 
made in deliberative assemblies. This is the case, to an 
extent, because in order for proposals to become law, 
they must be approved by a legislati ve majority. 
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However, before they can move to the floor for 
consideration, they must clear the committees to which 
iliey are assigned. 
Once assigned, bills must be scheduled for a public 
hearing in Nebraska, a step which is optional in every 
other state but North Dakota. Next, they are debated in a 
closed executive session (media representatives may 
attend and relate the discussion and votes to the pUblic). 
Then, bills must be reported. 
A favorable report by a committee majority sets in 
motion the process leading to final enactment. Thus, as 
few as 4 or 5 legislators in a body of 49 nearly control 
the fate of bills assigned to the committees on which 
they serve. Favorable committee reports have averaged 
as high as 71 percent (1973) and as low as 57 percent 
(1983) in recent legislative sessions. These are ratios 
that are somewhat higher than those in the typical state 
legislature (table 3). The trend is toward fewer bills 
being reported favorably. another indication of growing 
committee influence. 
Favorably reported committee measures are often 
sent to the floor with suggested changes or amendments. 
These amendments are considered first on the floor; 
other (outsider) amendments can be offered later. but 
they require more votes to be adopted. Thus, committees 
Table 3 - Percentage of favorable committee 
reports, selected states and years 
State Percent 
Alabama (1977) 67 
Nebraska (1983) 57 
14-state average (1967-77) 48 
Connecticut (1967) 27 
Source: Alan Rosenthal, Legislative Life, New 
York, 1981, p.199. 
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are afforded the best opportunity to shape the final 
version of bills that they find suitable for enactment. 
Another test of committee effectiveness concerns 
bills that fail to clear the committee because of a tie 
vote or because a majority of the committee members 
opposes them. Because all assigned bills must be 
reported, tie or negative votes, once reported, set the 
stage for a possible overrule of the committee decision. 
This is one procedural check legislative bodies have over 
committees. 
In Nebraska, a bill with a negative recommendation 
can be revived if 30 senators vote to do so; a bill stalled 
on a tie vote requires 25 supporters. Potentially, 
committees could be overruled this way dozens of times 
each session. Actually, they are rarely overridden. 
In the 1987 session, many disgruntled senators 
complained after bills they sponsored were stalled or 
killed, but they attempted to dislodge or revive only four 
of them. Committee decisions were sustained with one 
exception. Recently, other sessions had similar records. 
Negative committee decisions on major bills are rarely 
overturned. Thus, committees in the Nebraska legislature 
each review 25-100 bills each session with confidence 
that their decisions, even negative ones, will be final. 
Another indication of the increasing influence of 
committees is evident from a recent study of the 
relationship between bill viability and the timing of public 
hearings. Nearly all bills come to committees within the 
first 10 days of the session, and, because only a few 
can be heard each day (normally two to four), the time 
at which a bill is heard and reported makes a 
difference. 
The study revealed that bills positioned for an earlY 
hearing (first 30 days) were four times more likely to 
be enacted than those heard late (last 14 days) in the 
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chedule during the 1986 session (Nebraska Legislative ~unci1, 1986). This shows that analysts must probe 
beyond the formal rules and procedures to discern when, 
where, and by whom the critical decisions are made in 
public bodies such as legislatures. Thus, the scheduling 
of public hearings might seem to be merely a procedural 
matter; however, in 1986, it was a significant indication 
of a bill's chance for enactment into law. 
Legislative Process: Final Stages 
Once favorably reported, bills move to the floor and 
through it via a series of calendars and priority 
designations. Early in the session, during half-day 
committee and floor schedules, the least controversial 
measures are handled with a minimum amount of debate 
or discussion. Measures which generated little or no 
criticism during the committee phase are unlikely to 
encounter opposition on the floor. These measures often 
clarify or refine laws, and they move speedily through 
the required floor tests: General file, where most 
debating and amending occurs; select file; and final 
enactment. For example, in the 1985 session, the 
legislature gave final approval to more than 20 bills in 
one morning, and all but one passed unanimously (and it 
had only one negative vote). 
Of greater challenge to the legislature's deliberative 
capacity are measures that clear committees on a divided 
vote due to persistent differences of opinion. They 
include as many as 20-40 of the 500-700 bills considered 
each session, and they tax the resources of the 
legislature and its leaders considerably. 
The Nebraska legislature features nearly unparal-
leled openness at every stage of the process. Among 
American legislatures, one study found that Nebraska 
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was one of the best examples of decentralized 
institutional authority (Rosenthal, 1973). Thus, legislators 
are able to confront with ease bill managers and 
supporters if they choose to do so, and many do. The 
proponents must then decide, usually on the spur of the 
moment during heated floor debate, whether to accede to 
critics and amend the measure or continue to push their 
bills along over repeated attempts to amend, postpone, or 
defeat them. In the end, about 100 of these more 
controversial measures pass through the legislature. Many 
pass only after the most pri vi1eged of all bills (the 
appropriations bill which funds the programs and 
agencies of state government) clears the calendar. 
Beyond the agency spending bill rests another 150-200 
committee approved bills, and it is here that the 
legislature strives to align t.hem for floor consideration. 
Realistically, not all can be accommodated, and because 
political party discipline is absent and the designated 
floor leader (speaker) is not empowered to designate 
priorities, an alternative system evolved. Thus, each 
senator, at about the midpoint of the session, may 
designate one bill as a priority measure. Priority bills 
have special standing on the floor calendar; similarly, 
each committee can designate two bills and the speaker 
as many as 25. The legislature, in 1981, devised this 
practical but rather arbitrary solution for a persistent 
problem. 
Within this circle of priority bills are some that 
enjoy another political advantage because they come 
recommended by important outsiders, such as the 
governor, major private interest groups, or state 
administrative agencies. The impetus behind these bills 
ensures, no doubt, that they will be considered on the 
floor regardless of the scheduling system used by the 
legislators. 
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Final Enactment and Gubernatorial Action 
Bills that receive majority approval after debate and 
possible amendment during two preliminary stages, and 
are read and approved a third time, have nearly made it 
into law. Next, they are sent to the governor for 
approval or rejection, in full or part. 
Nebraska's governors possess slightly higher than 
average formal veto powers, but like their counterparts 
in other states, they have learned that it is more 
effective to involve themselves early in the legislative 
process if they do not support a measure or some aspect 
of it. Vetoing can be the least effective way to change a 
legislative proposal, because it complicates the negotiating 
or compromising process that accompanies most 
executi ve-legislati ve interaction. 
Still, Nebraska's governors have occasionally 
resorted to their veto powers. The number of vetoes 
varies greatly, but averages about 12 per session, a rate 
somewhat higher than in other states. In 1987, Governor 
Orr vetoed 19 bills or appropriations items, while 
former Governor Exon vetoed a record 31 measures in 
1973, and former Governor Morrison did not veto a 
single bill in 1963. 
Legislative overrides are possible on all vetoes, but 
they require a three-fifths majority vote, and the 
legislature, in most instances, is unable to muster the 
needed level of support. In 1987, the legislature overrode 
the governor 5 times, but in each instance the effect (on 
money or policy) was minor compared with the vetoes 
that were accepted or sustained. 
In recent sessions, the governor has made major 
reductions in spending measures through line-item vetoes, 
and the legislature has restored some, occasionally much, 
of the reductions. No single statement can relate how the 
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legislature responds to executive vetoes, but the governor 
is much more often sustained than overridden, both on 
substantive policy enactments and on spending and 
appropriations items. 
Citizen Lawmaking 
Nebraska is one of about twenty states that allows 
the citizenry to respond directly to legislative action or 
inaction using two direct democratic tools--the 
referendum and the initiative, both adopted in the early 
19OOs. The referendum power allows citizens to repeal 
any law, and it is triggered by petition signatures equal 
to 5 percent of the vote cast in the previous election. If 
the signers number 10 percent, a new law is postponed 
until the voters determine its fate. The use of the 
referendum has been episodic over the years. In just 
over half the instances (8 of 14), the referred measure 
has been rejected by the voters. 
The initiative represents another restraint on the 
legislature; it is based on the premise that the legislature 
is reluctant or unwilling to act on some matters of 
public concern. In this circumstance, the petitioners must 
accumulate signatures that are equivalent to 7 percent of 
the vote cast, and then the measure is put on the ballot 
for popular approval or rejection. In only 2 of 11 
instances when this device was used did the voters 
accept the petitioners' proposals. 
In Nebraska, the record is mixed regarding the 
impact of the legislative initiative and referendum. Both 
devices have been implemented occasionally. The voters 
often side with the petitioners on referred laws 
( especially if they deal with tax increases or more 
spending), but rarely support petitioners who advocate 
new legislation using the initiative. 
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summary 
Given the range of legislative outcomes (from 
speedy enactment to casual rejection) for bills in the 
Nebraska Unicameral, it may be helpful to categorize the 
fates of bills. The simplest to describe are the few 
dozen noncontroversial bills that remedy or clarify some 
aspect of current law. A measure is drafted, introduced, 
and referred to committee; an early hearing is held with 
perhaps only the bill's introducer appearing; it is 
promptly given a favorable report, moves through the 
various floor stages without opposition, is enacted, and 
the governor signs it into law. 
At the other end of the spectrum are measures that 
engender controversy from start to finish; in a typical 
session they number from 20 to 40 bills. There may be 
a dispute about which committee should receive the bill; 
the public hearing tends to be long and spirited, with 
repetitious claims and charges regarding the bill's merits 
or demerits. A divided committee forwards it to the 
floor after a review of the various options. On the 
floor, the committee amendments, as well as others, are 
considered in order to refine the measure and win over 
some of its detractors. The bill advances after strenuous 
debate, and is enacted over the objections of many 
opponents. Finally, the governor signs the bill, but voices 
some disagreement with certain provisions. 
Between these extremes are about 200 other 
measures which proceed, some haltingly, others steadily, 
through the committee tests and floor hurdles. 
The following are examples of each type of bill 
introduced in the 1987 session of the Unicameral. Early 
in the session, a measure allowing school districts to 
establish lines of credit with financial institutions (LB 
147) was enacted unanimously before the session was 3 
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weeks old. Another issue (petition requirements in the 
initiative and referendum processes (LB 716 and LR 
188» was discussed often in and out of committee. 
eventually, it was sent to the floor with th~ 
understanding that it would be studied during the interiIll 
and acted on during the next session. A controversial 
measure was discussed throughout the session--liability 
insurance limits (LB 425). Disagreement erupted 
regarding the committee to which it should be referred 
(judiciary or banking); it became stalled after the public 
hearing, and it remained in committee throughout the 
session, despite numerous indirect attempts to force it 
from the Judiciary Committee. Its prospects for the next 
session are difficult to assess.4 
An example of midstream executive-legislative 
compromise occurred over the bill separating the federal 
and state personal income taxing systems (LB 773). 
When the measure appeared to be in some jeopardy, the 
governor and Revenue Committee members compromised 
on some of its provisions. The reworked support base 
was sufficient to ensure its enactment, despite persistent 
opposition on the floor by a few senators. 
An example of a reverse strategy took place with a 
measure to continue a diversion of some tax revenues on 
auto sales to the general treasury from the highway trust 
fund (LB 470). The same leaders (Revenue Committee 
members and governor) advocated its adoption, but 
recanted after significant opposition formed inside and 
outside the legislative chamber. 
The common factor in these examples is the extent 
to which controversy, real or latent, envelopes legislative 
proposals, and, once it emerges, the way in which it is 
dealt with by the bills' advocates. Strategies vary widely 
for dealing with opponents. Attempts to allay them are 1M) 
doubt al ways considered. Acceding to opponent$' 
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criticisms and altering a proposal in a basic way is a 
crucial decision because it could speed the measure 
toward enactment or, conversely, make it unlikely, or 
impossible, for the proposal to maintain the majority 
support needed to advance in committee and on the floor. 
Thus, the management of conflict is the major 
challenge and opportunity the sponsors and advocates of 
policymaking proposals face in the Nebraska Unicameral. 
The absence of political parties and a second chamber in 
the legislature changes the nature of the challenge. On 
balance, it is somewhat easier for proponents, given the 
minimal structural and partisan constraints in the 
Nebraska Unicameral. 
Evaluating the Unicameral 
In the early 1970s, a citizen reform group examined 
all state legislatures to measure their capabilities (figure 
2). The Unicameral was rated ninth in the country and 
much of the high rating stemmed from the simplified 
structure and procedure inherent in unicameralism. More 
recently, the Unicameral has been evaluated by the public 
through polling devices, and the ratings assigned are 
slightly favorable and somewhat higher than those 
achieved by legislatures in other states. 
Senator Norris promised the citizenry that the 
reform would improve legislative performance. Norris' 
goals are restated, and table 4 shows the extent to which 
iliey have been achieved. 
Norris believed that an effective legislature should 
be small in size, provide members a long term of 
office, compensate them for full-time service, and be 
chosen on a nonpartisan ballot. Norris also urged that the 
legislature's bill deliberation process be open and 
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FIGURE 2 
Capability Ratings of Selected State Legislatures 
-
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Source: Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, The Sometime Governments: 
A Critical Study of the 50 American Legislatures, (2nd ed.). Kansas City, MO. 1973. 
unstructured. He was opposed to delegation of bill 
review powers to the committees or officers, and he 
recommended that all bill votes be recorded and 
publicized. He thought these changes would provide 
representatives and a system that would best allow the 
public's interest to be pursued. 
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Ie 4 - Extent to which Norris' goals have been achieved 
T3b h Nebraska Unicameral, 1987 
in t.ve __ ---------------.--------------------~I~----------­
Achievernent 
G03 1 
Ch3 rnber : 
o en-floor process 
::ea k leaders/committees 
curtail special Interests 
Eliminate secrecy 
Leg i 51 a tors: 
Small number . 
-
Full-time compensation 
Long term in offi c: 
j,\onparti san selection 
Fully Nearly Some 
accepted accepted disparity 
--->x 
--->x 
x---> 
x<---
x<---
--->x 
1ArrowS indicate the historical direction of chang-e. 
Wide 
di spari ty 
---)x 
--->x 
Which of Norris' goals have been realized? The 
nonpartisan selection of a small number of legislators 
serving a long term has become a reality, especially 
since the term was increased to 4 years. Originally, 
Norris preferred a body of 25, but later agreed to a 
minimum of 30 and a maximum of SO, as stipulated in 
the proposal. When the size was set at 43, and later 
raised to 49, seemingly, he would have dissented. The 
nonpartisan feature continues to draw criticism from 
most political party leaders and some outside evaluators; 
conversely, support for the nonpartisan system remains 
very high among senators and the public. 
The greatest variances between Norris' plan and 
current practice are the influence of lobbyists and the 
compensation of legislators. The impact of lobbying is 
especially difficult to measure, but studies indicate that 
Nebraska is a strong lobby state, one where both the 
potential for and activity of lobby groups is 
comparatively high. The reasons for this include: The 
lack of a diversified economy, weak political parties 
outside the legislature and their absence inside it, and the 
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relatively low level of citizen involvement in state 
governmental activities. Legislative salaries continue to 
veer from Norris' ideal; since 1968, the voters have 
rejected nine proposals to increase legislators' 
compensation. Originally, legislative salaries Were 
commensurate with their time commitment. 
Moderate departures from Norris' recommendations 
are evident within the chamber. Floor procedures are 
somewhat more controlled now than they were, and the 
standing committees and the speaker have watched their 
roles increase. Senators have chosen to delegate 
increased powers to the committees and leaders, despite 
Norris' admonitions. 
Overall, the Norris legacy remains intact in the 
Unicameral. Certain of his ideals seem to have become 
unrealizable (such as, tight control over the special 
interests) or unattainable (such as, high compensation for 
legislators). It is in these areas that the legislative 
reform agenda in Nebraska is most in need of review, 
assessment, and possible remedial action. 
Endnotes 
l. Unicameral legislatures at the state level were in occasional use until 
the 1840s when Vermont adopted a bicameral system. All states used 
bicamerals until Nebraska's change to unicameralism in 1934. The 
Minnesota legislature was, by statute, a nonpartisan body for many years, 
but the lawmakers switched to a partisan arrangement in 1971 after an 
extensive system of unofficial partisanship evolved in the election, 
organization, and operation of that body. (Mitau, 1960). 
2. Occasionally, the geographic pattern is deviated from on certain 
committees. Senators from urban areas are disinclined to serve (or stay) 
on the Agriculture Committee, and rural senators react similarly to ~e 
Urban Affairs Committee. Senators with approval can exchange posts. This 
means the regions lose or gain some committee representation. More 
inexplicable is the presence of only one Omahan on the important Revenue 
Committee in 1987, whereas four are on the equally important Judiciary 
Committee. (Omaha World-Herald, 1987). 
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3 A national sampling of state legislators showed that most decisions are 
~ade at regular committee meetings (39 percent). (Uslaner and Weber, 
1977). 
4 Bills that have not been enacted in the first session carryover to the 
n~xt session in each 2-year legislative cycle. 
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